

**Methodological Moment.** It was later thought that Gwǎn Jùng 管仲, a supposed merchant, had reorganized Chí to support a mass infantry army, making it stronger than other states, and that Jōu had recognized Hwán-gūng as a Hegemon: the enforcer of order among the states. Can we test this claim?

We might reflect: If Chí had such military superiority, it could act alone in some military matters, and dominate weaker states. But the facts do not match. In Hwán-gūng's reign, Chí used allies in 18 out of 27 military actions (67%). And its 9 independent actions were trifling: 3 statelets extinguished; 3 attacks on the Rúng; 1 relief of Syíng when attacked by the Dí 狄 people; 1 incident where Chí officers in occupied Swèi were killed by the populace; 1 victory in battle against middling Wèi. This is not the record of a great military power.

And if Hwán-gūng *had* made Chí a great power, the effect should have survived him, giving Chí a permanent edge over its neighbors. So again we ask: Was Chí after Hwán-gūng consistently superior to those neighbors? Again, no. Chí 6 times unsuccessfully attacked small Jyǔ, and 18 times unsuccessfully attacked middling Lǔ. If this is strength, what would weakness look like?

Here is one year's Lǔ record, from ten years after Chí Hwán-gūng's death:

**1:39** (CC 5/26:1-8, 0634).

- 26th year, spring, the Royal first month, day #56. The Prince met with the Master of Jyǔ and Níng Sù of Wèi. Covenanted at Syàng.
- A man of Chí made an incursion into our western border. The Prince pursued the Chí host as far as Syī, but could not overtake it.
- Summer. A man of Chí attacked our northern border.
- A man of Wèi attacked Chí.
- Gūngdǔ Swèi went to Chǔ to beg a host.
- Autumn. A man of Chǔ extinguished Kwéi and took the Master of Kwéi back with him.
- Winter. A man of Chǔ attacked Sùng and besieged Mín.
- The Prince, in command of a Chǔ host, attacked Chí and took Gǔ.
- The Prince returned from the attack on Chí.

Whether with his own host or one borrowed from an ally, the Prince of Lǔ here proves to be more than a match for Chí. This is the long answer to our original question. The short answer is to ask: If Chí *had* carried out a comprehensive restructuring, giving it a strong state and an infantry army in the mid 07c, why did the Chí statecraft and military experts of the 05c and 04c (as we shall see) go to the trouble of inventing these things all over again?

Conclusion: We have here a clear example of the Warring States tendency to project new developments back into earlier times, and, still more important, to give a new interpretation to what was still remembered of earlier events.

